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LEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE’S first book, a co-authored study of
the American penitentiary system, is a little-known work which is
-~ jL nevertheless of considerable theoretical interest. It represents
Tocqueville’s initial statement of his views concerning issues with which he
was to deal throughout his career, such as the political roles of religion and
of intellectuals, and the relation of theory to practice. Not only does the
book serve as a useful introduction to Tocqueville’s views, however; more
importantly, it helps to answer various questions to which Tocqueville’s
later, better-known works do not fully respond. In particular, The Peniten-
tiary System offers us a thoughtful presentation of Tocqueville’s analysis of
the problems and prospects of democratic reformism - the practical
expression of the democratic belief in human perfectibility.
In view of the claims that I make for the work, the relative oblivion into
which it has been cast by political theorists, and specifically by Tocqueville
scholars,’ may be a matter of some surprise. Two reasons account for the
lack of attention paid the work. First, the main text of the book was written
not by Tocqueville himself, but instead by Gustave de Beaumont, Toc-
queville’s close friend and companion on his voyage to America; Toc-
queville’s own contribution was limited to the notes and appendices
(Drescher 1968: 130-31). Secondly, I believe that scholars have assumed
that a book about penitentiaries must be narrowly technical, perhaps of
interest to penologists, but at any rate devoid of material relevant to
Tocqueville’s serious concern, the study of democracy.
With regard to the first reason, one can observe that Tocqueville’s
notes and appendices consisted of more than two hundred pages, and
have with reason been described as &dquo;a small encyclopedia of information
and surprises&dquo; (Pierson 1938: 705). In addition, even if the main text is
Beaumont’s, Beaumont was Tocqueville’s closest friend and intellectual
collaborator throughout his life. The most fundamental considerations,
however, are the following: in the course of presenting &dquo;A Rationale for
[the] Collective Study [of] Tocqueville and Beaumont,&dquo; Drescher notes
that &dquo;the identity of [Beaumont and Tocqueville’s] views [on penitentiary
reform] was never broken&dquo; (Social Reform 210). To this Boesche ( 1980:
550) adds that &dquo;Beaumont and Tocqueville had a unique relationship in
’ See Boesche, 1980 (the only article on Tocqueville’s study of the penitentiary of which I am
aware), p. 550: "Only two of his commentators [namely Pierson 1938, and Drescher
1968] cast more than an obligatory glance toward Tocqueville’s concern with prisons,
and even these two merely report Tocqueville’s thought, displaying no inclination to
analyze its significance." Boesche’s article itself is complementary to but quite different
from mine: it focuses on democratic despotism, whereas my concern here is with the
democratic belief in perfectibility.
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that neither would publish anything - at least when they were young -
until they had thoroughly discussed the ideas involved and reached a
common position; thus they almost never disagreed.... Certainly Toc-
queville read and approved of every word in the book [on penitentiaries].&dquo;
For these reasons, he concludes, &dquo;with J. P. Mayer, we may feel safe in
calling this work on American prisons ’Tocqueville’s first book’.&dquo;
My chief concern, however, is to rebut the second presupposition
against the significance of Beaumont and Tocqueville’s study of the
penitentiary. I have already asserted that the book’s importance lies in its
analysis of the democratic view of perfectibility, which is the theoretical
basis of democratic reformism; so as to substantiate the assertion, I now
turn to a consideration of Tocqueville’s discussions of perfectibility in his
other works.
DEMOCRACY AND PERFECTIBILITY
’ To what extent is social reform possible in democracies? To what
extent do democratic peoples believe that they can reform and perfect
their societies? The answers given by Tocqueville to these questions in
Democracy in America are ambiguous if not contradictory. On the one hand,
he suggests that democratic peoples constantly see changes taking place,
and come to believe that nothing is immutable, that they can shape the
world to suit themselves. Equality suggests to them the &dquo;philosophic
theory of the indefinite perfectibility of man,&dquo; which has &dquo;a prodigious
influence&dquo; upon them (Democracy 453). Without giving specific examples,
Tocqueville concludes his short discussion of the democratic belief in
perfectibility by warning that &dquo;democratic nations sometimes stretch [the
scope of human perfectibility] beyond reason&dquo; (Democracy 454).
On the other hand, soon afterwards, in discussing democratic histo-
rians, Tocqueville seems radically to reverse this judgement: democratic
man no longer appears as Prometheus, confident of his ability to trans-
form the world, but instead as Oedipus, despairing at his inability to
escape his fate. Equality lessens the impact that particular individuals can
make upon the world; accordingly, democratic historians explain change
in terms of general laws (whether economic, geographical, or racial) that
control the actions of human beings, but are beyond the control of human
beings. Such philosophies of history are pernicious in practice, whatever
their theoretical merits, because they call human freedom into question.
Democratic historians &dquo;take away from the peoples themselves the faculty
of modifying their own lot and make them depend either on an inflexible
providence or on a kind of blind fatality&dquo; (Democracy 496). Tocqueville
fears that their influence &dquo;will soon paralyze the activities of modern
society and bring Christians down to the level of Turks&dquo; (Democracy 496).
Thus Tocqueville points to two seemingly contradictory democratic
views: democrats are prone to exaggerate either their ability consciously
to perfect the world or their total inability consciously to affect its trans-
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formation. Tocqueville was later to chart these same two unsatisfactory
extremes in a highly illuminating letter to Gobineau:2 2
The last century had an exaggerated and somewhat childish trust in the
control which men and peoples were supposed to have of their own
destinies. It was the error of those times.... The weary aftermath of
revolutions, the weakening of passions, the miscarriage of so many gener-
ous ideas and of so many great hopes have now led us to the opposite
extreme. After having felt ourselves capable of transforming ourselves, we
now feel incapable of reforming ourselves; after having had excessive
pride, we have now fallen into excessive self-pity; we thought we could do
everything, and now we think we can do nothing.... This is really the
great sickness of our age; it is very different from that of our parents.
(Gobineau 231-32.)
At the highest level, Tocqueville’s attempt to chart a mean between the
extremes of absolute freedom and absolute determinism underlies his
whole philosophy of history. This is the import of the celebrated conclu-
sion to Democracy in America: &dquo;Providence did not make mankind entirely
free or completely enslaved. Providence has, in truth, drawn a predes-
tined circle around each man beyond which he cannot pass; but within
those vast limits man is strong and free, and so are peoples&dquo; (Democracy
705).
Unfortunately, as has been widely recognized, Tocqueville’s at-
tempted resolution of the problem of freedom and determinism leaves as
many questions asked as it answers (see Lively 1962: 39, Zetterbaum 1967:
12). We are not told within what limits human beings are free, why they
are free thus far but no further. The other Tocquevillian passages that I
have cited are equally ambiguous, because equally unspecific. The chap-
ter on perfectibility in Democracy in America gives us no concrete illustra-
tions of the democratic extension of the scope of human perfectibility
&dquo;beyond reason&dquo;; nor does the letter to Gobineau explain the distinction
between the utopian hope of &dquo;transforming ourselves&dquo; and the realistic
expectation of &dquo;reforming ourselves.&dquo;
Beaumont and Tocqueville’s study of the American penitentiary sys-
tem is of interest and importance in that it can help to resolve the problem
sketched above. To be sure, it presents no solution to the problem of
freedom and determinism in a metahistorical context. But more than any
of the works written by Tocqueville alone, it does concretely examine one
particular attempt by a democratic society to achieve reform, to perfect
itself, specifically by means of the moral rehabilitation of criminals.
2 It is noteworthy that Tocqueville accuses Gobineau himself of each of these vices at
different stages of the latter’s intellectual evolution. In 1843, Tocqueville thinks that
Gobineau, at age twenty-seven, is too confident of his ability to effect wholesale changes:
"The only difference between you and me is that you have more ambition than I
have.... You want to change the face of the world, nothing less. I am more modest"
(Gobineau 211). Conversely, Tocqueville rejects the racist theories propounded by
Gobineau as of 1853, because of their materialistic and predestinarian implications:
"The consequence ... is ... a vast limitation, if not a complete abolition of human
liberty. Thus I confess that after having read your book I remain, as before, opposed in
the extreme to your doctrine" (Gobineau 227).
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Precisely this emphasis, to be sure, might be thought to indicate the
irrelevance of Beaumont and Tocqueville’s study to present-day political
concerns; for virtually no one today is so optimistic as to believe that
incarceration in penitentiaries can facilitate the rehabilitation of a
significant percentage of convicted criminals.3 Thus a highly respected
social scientist, who specializes in the study of crime, rightly claims that
&dquo;today we smile in amusement at the n~ivet6 of those early prison refor-
mers [e.g., those whose work Beaumont and Tocqueville analyzed and to
a large extent admired] who imagined that religious instruction while in
solitary confinement would lead to moral regeneration&dquo; (Wilson 1983:
163); thus a Tocqueville scholar, even while defending the importance of
Tocqueville’s interest in the penitentiary, acknowledges that it seems to be
a &dquo;modest and anachronistic&dquo; &dquo;corner of Tocqueville’s thought&dquo; (Boesche
1980: 550).
Yet in spite of its focus upon a public policy measure whose inefficacy is
now by and large universally accepted, The Penitentiary System speaks to
political issues that are still of genuine interest today. This is true both
narrowly and broadly. Narrowly, Beaumont and Tocqueville’s discussion
of criminal rehabilitation is somewhat less &dquo;naive&dquo; than one might at first
suppose; I will in fact suggest that various approaches whose adoption has
been recommended to contemporary criminologists can in some respects
be understood as a return to the perspective of Beaumont and Toc-
queville. Broadly (and much more significantly), Beaumont and Toc-
queville’s analysis of the penitentiary reformers is applicable to a much
wider array of social reformers, many of whom continue both to exist in
and to make an increasingly prominent impact upon democratic societies
today. Thus The Penitentiary System is important because it points to both
the strengths and the weaknesses of social reform movements; it does so
by analyzing the politics and the psychology of reformist attempts to
perfect democratic societies generally, by means of its focus upon
penitentiary reformers specifically.
The broad applicability of The Penitentiary System’s analysis is suggested
by the range of the book’s subject matter, which deals with far more than
penitentiary reform alone. Although the study focuses upon the move-
ment for penitentiary reform, it also pays tangential attention to poor
relief, public education, abolitionism, and the temperance movement.4 4
3 See Martinson 1974: 49: "These data, involving over two hundred studies and hundreds
of thousands of individuals... , are the best available [; ... they] give us very little
reason to hope that we have in fact found a sure way of reducing recidivism through
rehabilitation."
4 Pierson (1938: 61) notes that "Tocqueville and Beaumont had unwittingly come to the
United States at the very moment when a great humanitarian movement was just
gathering way"; he alludes to abolitionism, the temperance movement, the promotion
of free public education, and the abolition of imprisonment for debt. The first of these
movements is discussed in Penite tiary 52; the rest are discussed in three of Tocqueville’s
appendices to the French text that are omitted from the translation (see Du Syst&egrave;me
P&eacute;nitentiare 300-307, 313-15, 316-18). The discussion of poor relief, which also consti-
tutes one of Tocqueville’s untranslated appendices, is found on pp. 308-13.
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Furthermore, while it is true that penitentiary reform is no longer an issue
for democratic reformers today, on Tocquevillian grounds one can
nevertheless suggest that there is a kinship between the penitentiary
reformers of the past and various social reformers of today (e.g., those
whose concern is to eliminate hunger, to achieve excellence in public
education, or to protect the environment). For Tocqueville would suggest
that all of these sorts of reformers, past and present, share an unmistak-
ably democratic ethos; for in his view, only democrats and not aristocrats
accept the assumption upon which their reforms are based - &dquo;that man in
general is endowed with an indefinite capacity for improvement&dquo; (Demo-
cracy 453).
For these reasons, The Penitentiary System can be understood as a
general study of democratic reformism in America. And in their most
sweeping overall assessment of reformism, which explicitly transcends the
specific issue of penitentiary reform, Beaumont and Tocqueville &dquo;declare
that the cause of reform and of progress in the United States seem ...
certain and safe&dquo; (Penitentiary 52); we will see that it is safe both from those
who would deny the possibility of reform and from those who would
exaggerate its extent.
Democratic social reform is possible, but it is necessary not to overstate
the benefits that it can produce. This is the most important conclusion of
The Penitentiary System. On its very first page, Beaumont and Tocqueville
observe that &dquo;there is not one philanthropic institution, the abuse of which
does not border closely on its usefulness&dquo; (Penitentiary 34); the main text
concludes with their proclamation &dquo;of a truth which cannot be neglected
without danger, viz., that the abuse of philanthropic institutions is as fatal
to society as the evil itself which they are intended to cure&dquo; (Penitentiary
158). Nevertheless, if the work rejects utopianism, it is equally critical of
fatalism as well: although &dquo;it may be true that [the] vicious state of society
[caused by the existence of poverty and crime] cannot be cured altogether,
it seems equally certain that there are circumstances which tend to aggra-
vate it, and institutions whose influence renders it less fatal&dquo; (Peni-
tentiary 35).
Thus do Beaumont and Tocqueville stake out a middle position with
respect to democratic reformism. Although reformers cannot achieve as
much as the reformers themselves hope to accomplish, neither are they
condemned to accomplish as little as the detractors of reform predict.5
Radical reformation is impossible because utopian; nevertheless, a more
modest and limited reformation, reflecting some of the presuppositions
5 It is interesting to note the affinity between Beaumont and Tocqueville’s position and that
advocated by James Q. Wilson (1983: 56-57), in opposition to sociologists of the left and
of the right, who both, he claims, tend to "speak out of ideology, not scholarship....
When [sociologists interested in crime] are brought forward and asked for advice, they
will say either (if conservative) that nothing is possible, or (if liberal) that everything is
possible." As against both attitudes, Wilson advocates "an experimental attitude toward
crime control [adopted by social scientists who] have become, in effect, policy analysts
trying to find out what works in the real world." For an indication that Beaumont and
Tocqueville’s "attitude toward crime control" is "experimental," see note 9 below.
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of classical liberalism, is feasible because realistic. In their study, Beau-
mont and Tocqueville emerge as advocates of this limited, classically
liberal reformation, in opposition to both utopians and fatalists. Their
middle position prefigures the middle ground later adopted by Toc-
queville with respect to the question of freedom and determinism, to
which I alluded above: in opposing the utopians, Beaumont and Toc-
queville in effect acknowledge that &dquo;mankind&dquo; is &dquo;not ... entirely free&dquo;;
but in opposing the fatalists, in effect they also assert that &dquo;within ... vast
limits ... man is ... free&dquo; (Democracy 705).
THE CRITIQUE OF UTOPIAN REFORMISM
In their report, Beaumont and Tocqueville describe the two rival
penitentiary systems brought into being by the American prison reform
movement: the Auburn or congregate system (instituted in Auburn, New
York between 1819 and 1823, and then in Ossining, better known as Sing
Sing, in 1825) and the Philadelphia or separate system (applied in
Philadelphia in 1829). In the Auburn plan, prisoners slept alone in their
cells at night, and labored together in workshops during the day. They
were forbidden in any way to communicate with one another; this pro-
hibition was enforced through the application of corporal punishment.
The Philadelphia system, by contrast, isolated each prisoner throughout
the period of his confinement; convicts ate, worked, and slept in indi-
vidual cells. In both systems, prisoners were given the Bible to read, so as
to encourage their moral reformation. Only the prison guards and
selected visitors (usually clergymen) were permitted to speak with the
convicts.
There are obvious similarities between the Auburn and Philadelphia
systems, which were based on common principles - convict labor and the
isolation of the convicts from one another - that were differently im-
plemented (Penitentiary 56). The chief difference between the two systems
followed from the fact that isolation in the Philadelphia penitentiary was
continuous, in that prisoners were incarcerated in individual cells day and
night; hence the prisoners were restricted to occupations that isolated
individuals could pursue, i.e., those for which cooperative labor was
unnecessary (Penitentiary 67-68).
Beaumont and Tocqueville point to one vitally important respect in
which the two systems resembled one another: &dquo;Moral and religious
instruction form[ed] ... the whole basis&dquo; of the attempted reformation of
convicts in both (Penitentiary 82). Throughout their report, Beaumont and
Tocqueville emphasize the contribution made by religious figures to the
entire American penal reform movement; the role played by religion is
central to both the great praise and the small amount of blame that they
bestow upon it. &dquo;The first idea of a reform in the American prisons,
belongs to a religious sect in Pennsylvania&dquo;: the Quakers’ opposition to
capital and corporal punishment led to the establishment of the Walnut
Street prison (an unsuccessful forerunner of the Philadelphia system) in
1786 (Penitentiary 37-38). Beaumont and Tocqueville contend that &dquo;in
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America, the progress of the reform of prisons has been of a character
essentially religious. Men, prompted by religious feelings, have conceived
and accomplished everything which has been undertaken&dquo; (Penitentiary
121; cf. the discussion of &dquo;some pious people&dquo; in Democracy 249-50).
Beaumont and Tocqueville assert that the principle of solitary
confinement for convicts, introduced by the Quakers, &dquo;rests upon a philo-
sophical and true conception.&dquo; But they immediately go on to add that the
first experiment with solitary confinement failed, because &dquo;the authors of
this theory had not yet founded its application upon those means which
alone could render it practical&dquo; (Penitentiary 39). This statement points to
an important theme in Beaumont and Tocqueville’s analysis: the contrast
with respect to the reformation of prisoners, and ultimately the perfecti-
bility of human nature, between theoretical views (generally with a basis in
religion) on the one hand, and practical views on the other. Tocqueville
explains that the prison reform movement consisted of a coalition be-
tween theoretical and practical reformers: &dquo;There are here [in Philadel-
phia] above all two kinds of men who take a prodigious interest in prisons,
although they envisage the subject differently.... These are the theorists
and the practical men: those who write and those who act&dquo; (letter to Mme.
Edouard of 18 October 1831; quoted in Pierson 1938: 458). We will see
that Beaumont and Tocqueville’s major reservation about the American
penitentiary reform movement specifically, and about democratic reform
movements generally, concerns the prevalence of idealistic but sometimes
impractical theorists therein. Theoretical reformers like the Quakers
undoubtedly benefit society, but the good that they do is to some extent
vitiated by their ignorance of practical realities, by their excessive op-
timism about human nature. The American penal reform movement
testifies to the advantages of the humanitarian idealism of the theorists,
but Beaumont and Tocqueville are quite aware of its possible dangers as
well. Where disagreements exist between &dquo;theorists&dquo; and &dquo;practical men,&dquo;
Beaumont and Tocqueville tend to admire the convictions of the former,
but to trust the experiences of the latter.
Beaumont and Tocqueville’s ambivalence toward theoretical refor-
mers is reflected in their attitude toward the American tradition of wide-
spread popular participation in politics: they praise it in part because the
common people act as a conservative check upon the more theoretical,
idealistic, innovative elites.
There are in the United States a certain number of philosophical minds,
who, full of theories and systems, are impatient to put them into practice;
and if they had the power themselves to make the law of the land, they
would efface with one dash, all the old customs, and supplant them by the
creations of their own genius, and the decrees of their wisdom. Whether
right or wrong, the people do not move so quickly. They consent to
changes, but they wish to see them progressive and partial. (Penitentiary
51-52; cf. the contrast between the &dquo;conservative interests&dquo; of the people
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and the &dquo;revolutionary instincts&dquo; of the &dquo;bold innovator,&dquo; in Democracy
638 .)6
When reform is &dquo;effected by a whole nation,&dquo; it is &dquo;prudent and reserved,&dquo;
insofar as &dquo;all of [the nation’s] customs are practical&dquo;; by contrast, &dquo;the
enthusiasm of ardent minds and enticing theories&dquo; runs the risk of re-
sulting in &dquo;precipitated trials&dquo; (Penitentiary 52; cf. the contrast between
&dquo;the heads of society&dquo; and &dquo;the mass of the population&dquo; on p. 197).
Idealistic reformers are too theoretical; they are &dquo;estimable men
whose minds feed upon philosophical reveries, and whose extreme sensi-
bility feels the want of some illusion&dquo; (Penitentiary 80). Because they &dquo;start
from abstractions which deviate more or less from reality,&dquo; the theoretical
penitentiary reformers exaggerate the good that penal reform can ac-
complish. Their exaggerated belief in human perfectibility leads them to
&dquo;hope for an epoch when all criminals may be radically reformed,&dquo; or to
find in &dquo;the penitentiary system ... the remedy for all the evils of society&dquo;
(Penitentiary 80).
Beaumont and Tocqueville believe that the absolute isolation imposed
upon prisoners in Philadelphia is more likely to effect their moral refor-
mation than any other conceivable system. Nevertheless, they are pro-
foundly skeptical as to whether radical moral reformation is achievable.
&dquo;The theories on the reform of the prisoners are vague and uncertain. It is
not yet known to what degree the wicked may be regenerated, and by what
means this regeneration may be obtained&dquo; (Penitentiary 81). They seri-
ously doubt that the prisoners’ readings of the Bible and encounters with
prison chaplains could lead to complete moral regeneration, to &dquo;the
radical change of a wicked person into an honest man&dquo; (Penitentiary 87).
Two prison chaplains estimated that perhaps 7 percent of the inmates of
their respective prisons became good Christians; even this modest figure
seems too high to Beaumont and Tocqueville (Penitentiary 88). One cannot
be certain that radical moral reformation is real, involving as it does the
conversion of &dquo;the soul,&dquo; &dquo;of the interior forum [that] God alone can
judge.&dquo; &dquo;Society&dquo; can neither &dquo;effect this radical regeneration&dquo; nor &dquo;pro-
v[e] if it exist&dquo; (Penitentiary 88; the emphasis appears in the translation).7 7
6 Both here and elsewhere, one senses that Beaumont and Tocqueville’s reaction against
theoretical reformers is influenced by their distaste for the legacy left by theoretical
social reformers who attained prominence before and during the French Revolution.
The similarity between French and American reformers is nicely conveyed by means of
an allusion to the work of Carl Becker in the title of Chapter XXXV of Pierson 1938:
"The Heavenly Prison of the Philanthropists." This similarity points to one of the most
interesting and important aspects of The Penitentiary System: nowhere in Democracy does
America seem as "French" (i.e., theoretical, impractical) as it does on occasion in the
earlier work. In other words, Penitentiary usefully supplements Democracy:it makes the
analysis of intellectuals in The Old Regime seem more relevant to American democracy
than one would expect it to be from a reading of Democracy alone. See pp. 15-17 below,
and especially note 10.
7 Beaumont and Tocqueville’s agnosticism with respect to the moral conversion of prisoners
is of theoretical interest, in that it reflects the classical liberal contention that religious
belief is an internal matter, beyond the detection and control of political authorities. Cf.
Democracy 293: "I do not know if all Americans have faith in their religion &mdash; for who can
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In addition, a more practical objection suggests itself: cynical prisoners
have a material interest in deluding chaplains into believing in their
reformation, which they can hope will lead them to be speedily paroled.
Conversely, pious clergymen have an ideal interest in deluding them-
selves that prisoners have been reformed, since this would testify to the
efhcacy of their spiritual ministrations (Penitentiary 87-88). Genuine re-
ligious reformation either cannot be detected, or else is easily confused
with its counterfeit produced by the hypocrisy of one party and the
credulity of the other. For this reason,
if the penitentiary system cannot propose to itself an end other than the
radical reformation of which we have just spoken, the legislature perhaps
should abandon this system; not because the aim is not an admirable one,
but because it is too rarely obtained. The moral reformation of an indi-
vidual, which is an important affair for a religious man, is little for a
politician. Or to express it better, an institution is only political if it be
founded on the interest of the mass; it loses its character if it only profit a
small number. (Penitentiary 89.)
Beaumont and Tocqueville’s skepticism regarding the radical refor-
mation of prisoners points to their ultimate preference for the practical
prison reformers over the theorists. They base their rejection of radical
reformation upon the testimony of practical reformers such as Elam
Lynds, the warden of Auburn penitentiary and the founder of Sing Sing;
they describe Lynds as a man &dquo;who has great experience in prison mat-
ters&dquo; (Penitentiary 88).8 In a conversation with Lynds (printed as an ap-
pendix to The Penitentiary System), Lynds tells them to distrust &dquo;all
[penitentiary] theorists,&dquo; who &dquo;deceive themselves&dquo; concerning both the
reformation of convicts and &dquo;in many other points, ... because they have
little knowledge of those of whom they speak&dquo; (Penitentiary 164). &dquo;Those
with practical experience,&dquo; Tocqueville writes, believe &dquo;in the uselessness
of the penitentiary system as far as moral reform is concerned&dquo; (Journey
23; for further evidence that this is Beaumont and Tocqueville’s view as
well, see Journey 205 and 208).
Thus Beaumont and Tocqueville’s analysis of democratic reformism,
as exemplified in the penitentiary reform movement, manifests a certain
skepticism about theory, a demand that theory be checked and confirmed
or refuted by practice.‘’ This was later to become one of Tocqueville’s
read the secrets of the heart?" Compare Beaumont and Tocqueville’s position with
Hobbes 1962: Ch. 40, p. 343: "As for the inward thought, and beliefofmen, which human
governors can take no notice of (for God only knoweth the heart)...." (The emphases
are Hobbes’s.) Cf. also Locke 1950: 18. I again allude to the impact of Beaumont and
Tocqueville’s liberalism upon their view of penitentiary reform on p. 22, below.
8 Beaumont and Tocqueville’s views are not, however, simply identical to those of Lynds. See
Penitentiary 88, where they suggest that "perhaps [Lynds] runs into the other extreme,"
in that he "considers the thorough reformation of a criminal a chimera." See also Journey
129, where Tocqueville refers to Lynds’s "despotic tendencies."
9 Their belief in the need to base theory upon empirical evidence can also be seen in
Tocqueville’s request to interview prisoners at Eastern State Penitentiary (in Philadel-
phia), which set a new empirical standard for penology. See Pierson 1938: 464: "Neither
16
central themes, both in Democracy in America (Vol. Two, Part I, Ch. 4) and
still more prominently in The Old Regime (Part Three, Ch. 1). Mutatis
mutandis, one can even detect an affinity between the utopian theorists
described in The Penitentiary System and the radical intellectuals de-
nounced in The Old Regime. The former, like the latter, can be said to have
&dquo;lacked the experience which might have tempered their enthusiasms,&dquo;
thus to have &dquo;failed to perceive the very real obstacles in the way of even
the most praiseworthy reforms&dquo; (The Old Regime 140).’o
If an affinity between the two types of theorists is evident, great and
obvious differences are admittedly evident as well. The penitentiary
theorists were devoutly religious, whereas the radical intellectuals were
atheists; the penitentiary theorists, such as Roberts Vaux and Edward
Livingston, were by and large wealthy philanthropists, men of substance
within their communities, 11 whereas the radical intellectuals were &dquo;men of
then nor earlier had it been the practice of even the most conscientious penologists to
consult the prisoners for information." (For a transcript of Tocqueville’s interviews, see
Du Syst&egrave;me P&eacute;nitentiare 318-36.)
10 It is puzzling that the influential theoretical reformers, whom Beaumont and Tocqueville
repeatedly designate as philosophers (Penitentiary, pp. 39, 45, 52, 80, 85, 116, 197), and
who figure so prominently in The Penitentiary System, are barely to be seen in Democracy in
America (at least in its more empirical first volume). Tocqueville in fact asserts that "the
spirit of the Americans is averse to general ideas and does not seek theoretical dis-
coveries" (Democracy 301; see also 429, 441-42); although he speaks in Democracy of
reformist activity in general (see p. 25, below), he never speaks of theoretical reformism in
particular.
I believe that two reasons explain the lack of explicit attention paid by Tocqueville
to the theoretical reformers in Democracy in America. To begin with, the intellectual
impetus behind the prison reform movement came from the American Northeast &mdash;
from Philadelphia, as we have seen, and in the case of the Auburn system from Boston
(Penitentiary 46, 193-94). Tocqueville may well have thought that the future impact of
theoretical reformers in America was likely to be rather minimal, insofar as the ur-
banized, civilized Northeast was rapidly being eclipsed by the development of a ruder,
uncouth Jacksonian frontier society (see Democracy 55, 200, 278). In addition, one must
recall that Tocqueville’s book is not about everything in America; it is about democracy in
America. Tocqueville’s principle of selection in Democracy in America was therefore the
relevance of any given phenomenon to the question of equality, as he himself explicitly
states (Democracy 417; see Lively, 1962, p. 27). Just as Tocqueville "dropped ... the
poor" from Democracy in America, so too did he drop the theorists, and for the very same
reason: theorization, like "institutionalized poverty[,] was Amcrican enough but not
quite democratic" (Drescher, 1968, pp. 73-76). That is to say, since the most important
characteristic of America was its egalitarianism, Tocqueville did not feel himself com-
pelled to highlight the exceptions (whether economic or intellectual) to the egalitarian
rule.
As a result of an historical reversal that Tocqueville evidently did not anticipate,
however, American intellectuals, so comparatively unimportant for so long, have come
to exert considerable political influence, at least since the time of the New Deal (see Shils
1972: 160-75). Thus The Penitentiary System’  emphasis upon the political impact of
reformist intellectuals ironically enables The Penitentiary System to come closer than
Democracy in America, at least in one significant respect, to giving a faithful and recogniz-
able picture of contemporary American democracy.
11 Vaux and Livingston are two of the prominent penitentiary theorists discussed by Beau-
mont and Tocqueville (Penitentiary 45). They are described by Pierson (1938: 459-60,
668n) in the following terms: Vaux was a man "of character and standing in the
community," "unquestionably one of the leading men of the State," who "had helped
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letters, men without wealth, social eminence, responsibilities, or official
status&dquo; (Old Regime 139).
Important as these differences are, they do not negate the affinity
suggested above. The gulf between religious and atheistic theorists is
undoubtedly vast, but in Tocqueville’s presentation it is not absolute. For
the radical French intellectuals were no less animated by a faith than were
the Quakers; and Tocqueville describes the faith of the former as &dquo;a
species of religion,&dquo; characterized by &dquo;an atmosphere of religious fervor.&dquo;
Like the Quaker penitentiary reformers, the radical French intellectuals
professed the democratic religion of the perfectibility of man; they aimed
at &dquo;nothing short of a regeneration of the whole human race&dquo; (Old Regime
13; see also 156). Furthermore, Tocqueville occasionally portrays modern
humanitarianism (as opposed to socialism) as a secularized form of Chris-
tianity (see Gobineau 193, 208, and Social Reform 192). Conversely, the
American penitentiary theorists were men of great practical experience
and accomplishments; but it is important to realize that their experiences
did not extend to the character and behavior of convicted criminals. We
have seen Elam Lynds remark that the penitentiary theorists &dquo;have little
knowledge of those of whom they speak&dquo;: Livingston, for instance, &dquo;al-
ways forgets&dquo; that &dquo;his theories of penitentiaries&dquo; are not meant to apply
&dquo;to people born like himself,&dquo; but to &dquo;coarse beings, who have had no
education, and who perceive with difficulty ideas, and often even sensa-
tions&dquo; (Penitentiary 164). The theoretical reformers had considerable
practical experience in their own world, but not much more than good
intentions and unexamined aspirations with respect to the world of the
prisons’ inmates. 12
Why, then, do Beaumont and Tocqueville assess the American intel-
lectual reformers so much more favorably than Tocqueville was later to
assess the radical French intellectuals? Several reasons could be suggested
(notably the far greater impact of the latter group upon the evolution of
society as a whole); but surely they do so in part because America’s
democratic reform movement consisted of a coalition between warm-
hearted theorists and hard-headed practitioners; the rhapsodic
utopianism of a Livingston could always be checked by the prosaic empiri-
cism of a Lynds. Penal reform in particular was experimental in the
United States, because of the competition between the states engendered
by the federal system, and because of the lively interest taken in it by
public opinion (Penitentiary 47-48, 63-64, 126).
Neither Livingstonian utopianism nor Lyndsian empiricism by itself
would have been as successful as the compound of them both.l3 In France,
found innumerable institutions," including "the Pennsylvania public school system."
Livingston was Andrew Jackson’s Secretary of State, who had earlier been "a lawyer,
Congressman, District Attorney, and finally mayor of New York City."
12 See also Pierson’s characterization of Vaux (1938: 460n) as "na&iuml;ve, literary, and philo-
sophic."
13 Although I have been emphasizing Tocqueville’s belief in the shortcomings of the
theoretical idealism of democratic reformers, he undoubtedly thought that this
theoretical idealism, when restrained by practical considerations and popular participa-
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as opposed to America, utopianism existed without an empirical correc-
tive. &dquo;In most cases, philanthropy is with us but an affair of the imagina-
tion&dquo; (Penitentiary 123). In France, as opposed to America, utopian
theorists did not allow themselves to be checked by the prudence and
caution of the popular majority (Old Regime 281; cf. Penitentiary 51-52).
Theoretical excesses existed in the American penal reform move-
ment ; these excesses, however, did not discredit the movement as a whole.
Beaumont and Tocqueville deny that one &dquo;must ... condemn this system
on the exaggeration of writers who, preoccupied with philosophical doc-
trines, have not guarded themselves against the danger attending any new
theory if carried to its full consequences&dquo; (Penitentiary 116). The American
penitentiary system fails to attain the goal of radical religious reformation.
Nevertheless, in spite of its failure to do so, it succeeds in bringing about a
less elevated kind of reformation.
The zeal of religious instructors, which is often insufficient to effect a
radical reform, has yet a great influence on that of the second grade....
, Though the preacher does not often arrive at his proposed end, it is yet
important that he should pursue it without interruption, and, perhaps,
that point which we have indicated, is obtained only because the aim is
taken much higher. (Penitentiary 90-91; see also the discussion of &dquo;Mr.
Tukerman&dquo; on p. 207.)
THE DEFENSE OF REALISTIC REFORMATION
In what does this &dquo;reform ... of the second grade&dquo; consist? Beaumont
and Tocqueville contend that the penitentiary can lead the convict to
approach what one might describe as the prudential morality of the
ordinary American. Their hope is well expressed in the following pas-
sage :
Perhaps, leaving the prison he is not an honest man, but he has contracted
honest habits. He was an idler, now he knows how to work.... Without
loving virtue, he may detest the crime of which he has suffered the cruel
consequences, and if he is not more virtuous he has become at best more
judicious; his morality is not honor, but interest. His religious faith is
perhaps neither lively nor deep; but even supposing that religion has not
touched his heart, his mind has contracted habits of order, and he posses-
ses rules for his conduct in life. (Penitentiary 90.)
Prisoners are unlikely to achieve the radical regeneration anticipated
by the theorists of penitentiary reform; but the more modest improve-
ment envisioned by the practitioners of penitentiary reform is attainable.
Beaumont and Tocqueville’s argument on behalf of the less elevated
reformation again reflects Elam Lynds’s influence upon them. For while
tion, had a vital role to play in improving democratic society. See Old Regime 156: belief
in "the perfectibility of man" is "admirable": without it, "a nation can but relapse into a
servile state"; with it, reformers can be "weaned ... away from self-regarding emotions,
stimulated to heroic deeds and altruistic sacrifices." This "idealistic" strain in Toc-
queville’s thought is also evident in his hope that greatness can continue to be possible in
democratic times: see pp. 24-25 below.
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denying &dquo;that the counsels of the chaplain ... make a good Christian of
[the convict],&dquo; Lynds also asserted &dquo;that a great number of old convicts do
not commit new crimes, and that they even become useful citizens, having
learned in prison a useful art, and contracted habits of constant labor.
This is the only reform which I ever have expected to produce, and I
believe it is the only one which society has a right to expect&dquo; (Penitentiary
164; see also the comment of Maxwell Willsee, &dquo;agent at Sing Sing,&dquo; in
Journey 208: reform is impossible &dquo;except in so far as the prisoners learn to
earn their living&dquo;).
In light of their preference for Lynds’s views over Livingston’s,_ it is
hardly surprising that The Penitentiary System reflects an apparent prefer-
ence for the &dquo;system of reformation&dquo; at &dquo;Auburn,&dquo; which &dquo;does not rest
upon so philosophical a theory&dquo;; the Philadelphia &dquo;system of reform,&dquo; by
contrast, &dquo;belongs to the highest philosophy&dquo; (Penitentiary 85). The Au-
burn system (Penitentiary 91) &dquo;is perhaps more conformable to the habits
of men in society, and on this account effects a greater number of refor-
mations.&dquo; In addition (Penitentiary 104), &dquo;the prisons, constructed on the
Auburn plan, are infinitely cheaper.&dquo; Drescher (1968: 137n) notes that
&dquo;the emphasis of Beaumont and Tocqueville’s first work led later schol-
ars ... to classify them as Auburnites.&dquo;’4
We have seen Beaumont and Tocqueville deny the likelihood of
religious reformation. Nevertheless, the reformation which they propose
in its stead could not be construed as a &dquo;secular&dquo; reformation. Although
religion cannot produce the &dquo;radical reform&dquo; at which it aims, in its
absence the reform &dquo;of the second grade&dquo; could not be achieved. In terms
of both its achievements and its limits, this points to a partial analogy
between the role religion plays in aiding the moral reformation of convicts
14 For this reason, one notes with surprise that by 1837, Beaumont and Tocqueville became
advocates of the Philadelphia system. Three reasons may be suggested for this sub-
sequent decision: (1) Beaumont and Tocqueville’s personal dislike for Charles Lucas, a
rival French prison reformer who supported the Auburn system (Pierson 1938: 712);
(2) their growing conviction that in practice isolation could not be maintained in
Auburn-style penitentiaries (Drescher 1968: 136-37); (3) their unwillingness to advo-
cate a system dependent for its success upon the administration of corporal punishment
("Rapport" 313; Social Reform 75).
Even as an advocate of the Philadelphia system, however, Tocqueville was never to
express much confidence in the possibility of radical reformation. See "Rapport" 321:
"To suggest to a convicted adult ideas radically different from those that he had
conceived until now, to inculcate in him wholly new sentiments, to change profoundly
the nature of his habits, to destroy his instincts, to make in a word a virtuous man of a
great criminal, that is assuredly such an arduous and a difficult enterprise, that one
could succeed in it only rarely." We saw on p. 10, above, that contemporary criminology
lacks confidence in the practicability of the rehabilitative ideal; the evidence here and on
pp. 14-15, above, suggests that there is less of a gap between Beaumont and Toc-
queville’s position and that of contemporary criminology than one might have sup-
posed. For even when Tocqueville came to advocate the Philadelphia system espoused
by the theoretical reformers, he maintained his realistic attitude toward the limits of
reformation: "If it is not sure that the system of individual imprisonment, more than any
other system, makes the convicts better than they were, at least it is sure that it prevents
them from becoming worse; and that is an immense result, the sole result perhaps which
it is prudent for a government to propose to itself" ("Rapport" 321; cf. Penitentiary 81).
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and the role that it plays in aiding the moral functioning of ordinary
citizens in democracies.15
The convict’s &dquo;religious faith&dquo; is &dquo;neither lively nor deep&dquo;; religion
&dquo;has not touched his heart,&dquo; but it has influenced his &dquo;mind,&dquo; which &dquo;has
contracted habits of order.&dquo; It is clear from Democracy in America that this
pragmatic, rationalistic acceptance of religion is characteristic of Ameri-
cans generally: &dquo;it would seem that the head rather than the heart leads
them to the foot of the altar.&dquo; Americans &dquo;practice their religion out of
self-interest,&dquo; and &dquo;often ... place in this world the interest which they
have in practicing it&dquo; (Democracy 530; see also 436, 448, 529). In America
generally as in the American penitentiary specifically, religion fails on the
whole to produce an other-worldly state of mind; it is nevertheless indis-
pensable, because it produces habits of orderliness and reliability that are
so conducive to success in this world. Tocqueville’s description of
&dquo;preachers in America&dquo; fits him as well as it does them: &dquo;it is often difficult
to be sure when listening to them [as it is when reading him] whether the
main object of religion is to procure eternal felicity in the next world or
prosperity in this&dquo; (Democracy 530).
Religion can influence convicts as it does ordinary Americans: it can
encourage them to be orderly, to restrain (although not to abolish) their
acquisitiveness, to abandon the pursuit of instantaneous gratification, and
to accept the lesser but legal pleasure of deferred gratification in its stead.
In general, Beaumont and Tocqueville’s realistic reform &dquo;of the second
grade&dquo; was intended to produce nothing more (but also not much less)
than the ordinary democratic human beings whose prosaic, unromantic
qualities are so well described by Tocqueville in Democracy in America. The
reformed convict is characterized by &dquo;honest habits,&dquo; and a &dquo;morality ...
of interest.&dquo; He is ‘ judicious,&dquo; he &dquo;knows how to work,&dquo; he &dquo;detest[s]
crime.&dquo; In all of these respects he is strongly reminiscent of democratic
man, who is concerned &dquo;to produce well-being,&dquo; who is characterized by
&dquo;reason&dquo; (not &dquo;genius&dquo;), &dquo;tranquil habits&dquo; (not &dquo;heroic virtues&dquo;), and -
most significantly - by &dquo;vices&dquo; (not &dquo;crimes&dquo;), by &dquo;few transgressions&dquo; (if
also by &dquo;few splendid deeds&dquo;) (Democracy 245).ls
15 Because religion is prevalent in America but not in France, Beaumont and Tocqueville are
skeptical as to the likelihood of the success of American-style penitentiary reform in
France (Penitentiary 121-23); for the same reason, of course (among others), Tocqueville
is skeptical as to the likelihood of the success of American-style political democracy in
France (Democracy 290-301; Old Regime 148-57).
16 The reformed convict and the ordinary American bear only a partial resemblance to one
another, however. Perhaps they differ most strikingly from one another with respect to
their positions on the continuum between isolation and association. As we have seen,
Beaumont and Tocqueville contend that convicts must be isolated from one another if
they are to be reformed (or at least not to be further corrupted); whereas Tocqueville
calls upon free people to employ "the art of association" (Democracy 517) in order to
maintain and expand their freedom. It is noteworthy that Beaumont and Tocqueville
are both very well aware of and very much untroubled by the discrepancy between their
prescriptions of isolation for prisoners and association for law-abiding citizens. See
Penitentiary 76: "We understand perfectly well, that an assemblage of criminals, all of
whom have infringed the laws of the land, and all of whose inclinations are corrupted,
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Nevertheless, the analogy between the convicts’ religiosity and that of
ordinary Americans is only partially valid. For Tocqueville at times ex-
presses hope that religion can greatly influence the behavior of demo-
cratic man: Tocqueville is not wholly content with the view of religion as
an agent that merely &dquo;restrain[s]&dquo; the democratic &dquo;taste for well-being&dquo;
(Democracy 448); thus he also states that belief in the immortality of the
soul is &dquo;indispensable to man’s greatness&dquo; - and worries lest the &dquo;proper
and legitimate quest for prosperity&dquo; lead democratic man to neglect his
immortal soul, hence to &dquo;lose the use of his sublimest faculties&dquo; and &dquo;at
length [to] degrade himself’ (Democracy 544, 543). Significantly, in this
respect one can discern a greater kinship between Tocqueville and the
theoretical reformers than I have previously suggested; for Tocqueville’s
focus upon &dquo;man’s greatness&dquo; points to a greater concern that man be
perfected than I have previously imputed to him.
I will return to this point in my conclusion. For the moment, however,
we should recall the limits to the kinship between Tocqueville and the
theoretical reformers: to the extent that Tocqueville hopes that religion
will greatly elevate men’s conduct, he nevertheless tends to restrict his
hope to ordinary citizens, and not to extend it to convicts. Although he
occasionally expresses the hope that religion can elevate the ordinary
citizen above the level of &dquo;decent materialism,&dquo; he demonstrates the realis-
tic character of his penitentiary reformism by hoping to elevate the
convict only to that level - the level at which people &dquo;abstain strictly&dquo; from
&dquo;physical delights that cannot be indulged without crime&dquo; (Democracy 534).
Understood in this modest sense of promoting &dquo;decent materialism,&dquo;
the reformation of prisoners is a realistic goal. 17 To this extent Beaumont
and appetites vicious, cannot be governed in prison according to the same principles,
and with the same means, as free persons, whose desires are correct, and whose actions
are conformable to the laws." See also Drescher 1968: 139.
17 Even this limited reformation, which I have been pleased to call "realistic," will, regretta-
bly, seem laughably utopian in view of the rate of recidivism prevailing in the American
penitentiary today. It is therefore important to remark that the intractability of the
problem of crime in contemporary America might well come as no surprise to Beau-
mont and Tocqueville. Were they alive today, Beaumont and Tocqueville would con-
ceivably not assert that "society in the United States is ... eminently religious"; further-
more, they would undoubtedly not assert that "the prisoner in the United States ...
breathes in the penitentiary a religious atmosphere" (Penitentiary 122). Although one
admittedly cannot prove that the decreasing influence of religion upon American life
has contributed to the increasing intractability of the problem of American crime,
speculation along such lines is suggestive and far from fruitless: see the discussion of the
transition from nineteenth-century "impulse control" (fostered by religious belief) to
twentieth-century "self-expression" (fostered by a decline in the power of religious
belief) in Wilson 1983: 228-40.
In addition to emphasizing the impact of religion, Beaumont and Tocqueville also
contend that American society’s youth and economic growth went far toward explaining
the solubility of the problem of American crime. "In America, where wages are ex-
tremely high, the convicts easily find labor when they leave the prison, and this circum-
stance favors their good conduct, when they have re-entered society." By contrast,
ex-convicts "in France ... are not infrequently brought back to crime by a fatal neces-
sity" (Penitentiary 131; see also 99). Arguably, twentieth-century America has come to
resemble nineteenth-century France, in terms both of the decreasing influence of
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and Tocqueville vindicate the cause of penitentiary reform against the
fatalistic attitude which would assert that human beings in democratic
times can in no way control their institutions and their fates. Thus they do
not believe &dquo;that nothing can be done towards the amelioration of our
prisons&dquo; (Penitentiary 132); they deny that the &dquo;evil&dquo; of the prison (i.e., its
tendency further to corrupt convicts, as opposed to reforming them) is
&dquo;incurable,&dquo; because they realize that &dquo;others have found means to eradi-
cate [it]&dquo; (Penitentiary 135).
Nevertheless, Beaumont and Tocqueville’s conception of reform dif-
fers greatly from that of the penitentiary theorists. The theorists commit
the democratic error of stretching &dquo;the scope of human perfectibility ...
beyond reason&dquo; (Democracy 454). The theorists exaggerate human perfec-
tibility, in that their reformation attempts to convert the convict into a
human type who is rarely to be seen, particularly among former criminals.
In any case, the deeply religious true Christian whom they aspire to bring
into being is more likely to be found in aristocratic societies than in
democratic ones: &dquo;deep convictions&dquo; and &dquo;acts of profound devotion&dquo; are
more likely to characterize aristocratic human beings than democratic
ones (Democracy 245).
By contrast, Beaumont and Tocqueville limit the scope of penitentiary
reform. One way in which they do so is by insisting that the reformation of
convicts be classically liberal as well as democratic. 18 Just as the rulers of
the state should not attempt to restructure the souls of its subjects in the
hope of inculcating moral purity, so should the administrators of a
penitentiary not expect to succeed in such an undertaking with its in-
mates.&dquo;’ Within the prison as well as outside it, reform instituted by
government must be limited because classically liberal: it must aim to
affect people’s behavior, but can do little officially to promote altruistic
religious motives as a basis for their behavior. 20
religion upon society, and of the shortage of economic inducements that could motivate
the released convict to obey the law; if this is so, Beaumont and Tocqueville’s analysis can
account for the ineffectiveness of twentieth-century American penitentiaries in reduc-
ing the rate of crime, in that it accounts for the ineffectiveness of nineteenth-century
French penitentiaries in doing so.
18 Beaumont and Tocqueville’s reform is ultimately more democratic than is the theorists’,
although (and because) they do not commit the democratic error of the latter: for as we
have seen, Beaumont and Tocqueville’s reform is "founded on the interest of the mass."
19 Note the affinity between Beaumont and Tocqueville’s position and that recommended by
Wilson (1983: 49) to criminologists, who should, Wilson contends, learn to think like
policy analysts: "[The policy analyst] would suspect ... that changing the mental state of
citizens is very difficult, quite costly, hard to manage organizationally, and liable to
produce many unanticipated side effects." See also p. 50: "A serious policy-oriented
analysis of crime ... would place heavy emphasis on manipulation of objective condi-
tions, ... because behavior is easier to change than attitudes."
20 Cf. Democracy 543, 545-46: although "it is ever the duty of lawgivers" in democratic times to
combat materialism, to further belief in the immortality of the soul, "to turn [men’s]
attention toward heaven," Tocqueville admits that "it is far from easy to say what those
who govern democratic peoples should do to make [spiritual conceptions] prevail"; his
sole suggestion is that governments "daily ... act as if they believed [in the immortality
of the soul] themselves."
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CONVICTS, REFORMERS, AND PERFECTIBILITY
To this point my analysis of The Penitentiary System has suggested that it
was Beaumont and Tocqueville’s concern to question the democratic
belief in perfectibility, to cause it to be placed within narrower bounds.
Thus I have repeatedly noted their skepticism regarding theoretical re-
formers, whose desire to do good too often and too readily exceeds their
ability to do good. Beaumont and Tocqueville recognize the beneficence
of the theoretical reformers’ intentions and convictions, but insist that the
reformers be judged by their impact and accomplishments instead of (or
at least as well as) by their intentions and convictions.
Understood in this way, Beaumont and Tocqueville’s position can be
seen as a forerunner of the critique of idealistic reformers expounded by
various hard-headed and unsentimental contemporary social scientists,
such as Edward C. Banfield. Thus Banfield (1974: 273-74) claims that &dquo;the
American political style was formed largely in the upper classes... ,
mainly by people of dissenting-Protestant ... traditions [such as the
Quaker penitentiary reformers]&dquo;; he equates that style with &dquo;confiden[ce]
that with a sufficient effort all difficulties can be overcome and all prob-
lems solved, and [with the perception of] a strong obligation to try to
improve not only [one]self but everything else: [one’s] community, [one’s]
society, the whole world&dquo;; he worries that because of this confidence and
this perception, &dquo;we do not hesitate to attempt what we do not have the
least idea of how to do,&dquo; and that &dquo;we are not reconciled to - indeed, we
do not even perceive - the necessity, so frequently arising, of choosing
the least objectionable among courses of action that are all very unsatis-
factory.&dquo;21
There is an undeniable similarity between Banfield’s position and that
of Beaumont and Tocqueville, but the two positions are not identical. I
believe that it is fair to say that Banfield’s position is that the idealistic
reformers’ conception of perfectibility is illusory, does more harm than
good, and should be abandoned as an impossible dream. Beaumont and
Tocqueville’s position, by contrast, is somewhat more ambivalent, because
their evaluation of the idealistic reformers is considerably more favorable.
It is true that Beaumont and Tocqueville also portray the theorists’
conception of penitentiary reform as something of an impossible dream,
and also criticize it for that reason; by referring to Democracy in America,
however, we can see that in one respect Tocqueville praises it for the same
reason as well. We can begin to understand this Tocquevillian ambiva-
lence by recalling our earlier discussion of Tocqueville’s two contrasting
views of the role of religion in democratic society: in one view, religion is
valued in that it serves to moralize the materialistic mediocrity of demo-
cratic society; whereas in the other view, it is valued in that it can serve to
21 Cf. Tocqueville’s formulation in his appendix on poor relief, n Du Syst&egrave;me P&eacute;nitentiare 309:
legislation establishing poor relief gives birth to "extreme difficulties," which are "inhe-
rent." They are difficulties "whose number can be diminished by more or less perfect
administrative procedures; but ... one must despair of seeing [them] completely
disappear."
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some extent to elevate democratic society above materialistic mediocrity,
by making &dquo;greatness&dquo; possible even in democratic society.
The ambivalence toward democracy that these views reflect is not
restricted to Tocqueville’s analysis of religion. A related ambivalence runs
throughout much of Democracy, concerning the extent of and the reasons
for the defensibility of democratic society: is democratic society defensible
in spite of its mediocrity (Democracy 245) or because it is instead to some
extent compatible with greatness? In discussing Beaumont and Toc-
queville’s analysis of the reformation of criminals, I have almost exclu-
sively emphasized the first line of defense. Yet Tocqueville occasionally
employs the second line of defense as well, which is evident in his sugges-
tion that &dquo;distant goals&dquo; be set &dquo;for human endeavor&dquo; in &dquo;ages of equality,&dquo;
in his assertion that &dquo;the progress of the body social&dquo; depends upon
&dquo;ambition[’s]&dquo; having &dquo;force and ... greatness&dquo; (Democracy 547, 632).
Both lines of defense are already present, in embryo so to speak, in The
Penitentiary System. We have seen the first in the impact that reform can
make upon the prisoners: the second is evident in the impact that reform
can make upon the reformers themselves. For evidence on behalf of
human perfectibility is provided not only by the behavior of those who are
supposed to be reformed: it is also provided by the behavior of those who
do the reforming.
Tocqueville criticizes the materialistic mediocrity of democratic soci-
ety : he views it as the forerunner to democratic despotism, in which the
individual &dquo;withdraw[s] into himself,&dquo; and &dquo;pursu[es] ... petty and banal
pleasures&dquo; (Democracy 692). We have seen that this self-absorption and
concern with production and consumption characterize the penitentiary,
composed as it is of isolated and productive convicts. Tocqueville’s prog-
nosis of the possible evolution of democratic society clearly reflects his fear
that democratic human beings may freely choose to isolate themselves
from one another, or in effect freely impose upon themselves the isolation
and exclusive focus upon economic production that is forcibly imposed
upon convicts in the penitentiary. This is suggested by Tocqueville’s
occasional employment of the imagery of confinement and incarceration
in Democracy - e.g., when he states that in democratic times &dquo;there is
danger that [each individual] may be shut up in the solitude of his own
heart&dquo; (Democracy 508; see also the allusions to being &dquo;shut up in himself,&dquo;
being &dquo;b[ou]nd ... in tight fetters,&dquo; being &dquo;shut ... up more and more
narrowly,&dquo; on pp. 430, 436, 645). In part for this reason, &dquo;the most
complete despotism&dquo; -i.e., the American penitentiary (Penitentiary 79) -
can justifiably be seen as the prototype of the new despotism into which,
Tocqueville worries, democratic society may evolve (Boesche 1980:
550-52, 558-60).
Nevertheless, the new despotism of isolated individuals is just a worri-
some possibility for the democratic societies of the future; Tocqueville
does not regard it as an inevitability. For if a pessimistic outlook for
democracy is prefigured in Penitentiary’s analysis of the convicts, there is a
sense in which a more optimistic outlook is prefigured in its analysis of the
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penitentiary reformers. The reformers were not &dquo;withdrawn into&dquo; them-
selves, and did not &dquo;pursu[e] ... petty and banal pleasures.&dquo; Instead they
united with one another in an attempt to benefit their society, and did not
simply act to further their personal prosperity. Whatever the flaws in the
reformers’ proposals, the reformers were able to involve themselves and
to involve others in an effort in which long-range goals and concern for
others were able at least to supplement immediate goals and concern for
self.
This praise for the reformers is apparent in Tocqueville’s sole discus-
sion of the penitentiary reform movement in Democracy in America. As in
The Penitentiary System, his presentation of the reform movement is by no
means uncritical: thus he points (p. 250) to its failure thoroughly to follow
through on its reforms and to consider their consequences. Nevertheless,
in Democracy as in Penitentiary, on the whole he depicts the zealous en-
thusiasm of the reformers favorably: the &dquo;exhortations&dquo; of &dquo;some pious
people&dquo; brought about &dquo;the happy revolution&dquo; in which &dquo;the state of the
prisons&dquo; was made &dquo;better.&dquo; They did so by &dquo;rous[ing]&dquo; &dquo;the public,&dquo; and
causing it to &dquo;cooperate with ... eagerness&dquo; (Democracy 249-50).
Drawing on Tocqueville’s analyses in Democracy, we can see that, in
addition to benefiting society and the prisoners, the reformers’ activity
also helped to improve and perfect themselves: this is not the least lauda-
ble aspect of their activity in Tocqueville’s view. For Tocqueville praises
cooperative reformist activity not only (or perhaps even primarily) for its
impact upon society; he also praises it for its impact upon the activists
themselves. &dquo;It is incontestible that the people often manage public affairs
very badly, but their concern therewith is bound to extend their mental
horizon and shake them out of the rut of ordinary routine&dquo; (Democracy
243-44). Tocqueville defends cooperative activity because it reforms those
who engage in it: it broadens their horizons by causing them to consider
others as well as themselves. &dquo;Feelings and ideas are renewed, the heart
enlarged, and the understanding developed only by the reciprocal action
of men one upon another&dquo; (Democracy 515; see also 512-13). These discus-
sions in Democracy of the benefits that accrue to cooperative activists as a
result of their activity apply to the reformers described in Penitentiary - in
part because they presumably reflect Tocqueville’s experiences with them
and with similar reformers.
In short, The Penitentiary System presents us with two alternative images
of democratic men: the convicts, the isolated materialists within the
penitentiary, and the reformers, the cooperative idealists outside it.
Beaumont and Tocqueville criticize the reformers for exaggerating the
extent to which the convicts can be perfected; but they also praise the
reformers for exemplifying the extent to which cooperative idealists can
perfect themselves. Beaumont and Tocqueville are far from oblivious to
the element of truth in the contention by Banfield (1974: 275), that &dquo;the
reformer wants to improve the situation of the poor... , not so much to
make them better off materially as to make himself and the whole society
better off morally&dquo;; but their work also suggests a sense in which Banfield’s
statement confers praise as well as blame upon reformers.
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